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Abstract
Voters respond di¤erently to trend growth as opposed to economic cycles in GDP.
When assessing incumbent competence the rational voter lters out economic cycles
when they are the product of external shocks but rewards strong trend growth over the
previous term of o¢ ce. Voters also respond to policy platforms, and parties closest to
the median voter have an advantage à la Downs (1957). This advantage is theorized to
be heightened in times of recession. Using data from elections in OECD countries and
a much more exacting econometric specication than used in previous analyses we nd
robust evidence of a positive vote response to strong performance in trend growth. We
also nd evidence to support the hypothesis that centralizing garners additional votes
during recession.
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1 Introduction
If voters are rational and care about the state of the economy, and politicians di¤er in
their capacity or willingness to deliver particular economic outcomes, then economic voting
follows inexorably as a theoretical prediction. Moreover, without evidence that economic
performance a¤ects the vote, the extent to which elections operate at all as a mechanism
holding the government to account can be called into question (Cheibub and Przeworski,
1999). However, the current consensus in the voluminous empirical literature on economic
voting is of "great instability" (Paldam, 1991).1 Anderson (2007), citing McDonald and
Budge (2005) summarizes this mysterious impasse: "Cumulatively, the evidence available to
date strongly suggests that the economic voting e¤ect - dened by a bad economy leading
to lower government support or loss of o¢ ce - is intermittent, highly contingent, and sub-
stantively small. ... Economic e¤ects on election outcomes do not qualify as a robust fact
about elections."
We contend that the premises in the opening sentence are reasonable.2 As such the
absence of evidence is a problem. In this paper we propose a simple reconciliation: the
performance variable in previous work conates randomness with competence. The headline
macroeconomic performance measure is GDP, but empirical work to date examining vot-
ing responses to GDP has focussed exclusively on measures reported in raw terms. This is
surprising, and we argue mistaken, because separation of the short-run economic cycle and
1For systematic evaluations of the literature see Anderson (2007), Duch and Stevenson (2008), and Lewis-
Beck and Steigmeier (2000).
2Voter rationality in particular has recently come under attack. Caplan (2007) argues that democracies
frequently adopt and maintain damaging policies due to systematically erroneous beliefs held at large. Em-
pirical work by Achen and Bartels (2004), Leigh (2009) and Wolfers (2007) amongst others nds that events
that are recognizably outside the control of the government inuence incumbent popularity.
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long-run economic growth is central to modern macroeconomic thinking. At any point in
time GDP is constituted of its trend and the cyclical component around that trend, and
the drivers of each are almost always theorized to be distinct. As a result the two separate
elements should have quite di¤erent impacts upon voting. In particular, in short-run models
of the macroeconomy uctuations typically stem from shocks of some sort, which in many
instances are outside the control of policymakers. Such events may include oil price shocks,3
global nancial shocks such as the recent and ongoing credit crunch, or indeed "irrational
exuberance" in the good times. Recessions and booms come and go, with politicians dis-
associating themselves from the former, whilst taking credit for the latter.4 If the cyclic
movements are born out of events outside of the control of the government,5 rational voters
will hold the government responsible for its handling of the cycle, but not for originating it.6
Indeed, the absence of evidence of an economic vote in these instances constitutes evidence
in favor of, rather than evidence against, rationality in voting.
On the other hand underlying trend growth, or growth in potential output, certainly
when it exceeds the global average, should be a key driver of voting. The idea that cross
country di¤erences in income per capita are partly driven by government policy is central
to the literature on economic growth. For example Hall and Jones (1999) argue for the
3Hamilton (2008) notes that 9 out of the 10 post-war US recessions were preceded by spikes in oil prices
and in this and argues for a causal relationship.
4Towards the end of the Great Moderation politicians were also, it turns out prematurely, congratulating
themselves on the "end of boom and bust".
5We would not want to rule out cyclic movements initiated by policy completely. For example it is
possible that the UK recession of the early 1980s was brought about by anti-inationary monetary policy.
Incumbent governments have also been blamed for the current and ongoing recession by opposition parties
around the world. Even here, however, the main electoral response has been to the way governments dealt
with the recession once it was there.
6A similar criticism is leveled by Alesina and Roubini (1992) against early versions (e.g. Nordhaus, 1975)
of the political business cycle. Rational voters should ignore opportunistically engineered pre-electoral
booms as they will be recognized to be unsustainable (see also Alesina et al, 1999).
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fundamental importance of social infrastructuredened explicitly as the "the institutions
and government policies that determine the economic environment within which individuals
accumulate skills, and rms accumulate capital and produce output". Given the wide disper-
sion in economic performance it is clear that social infrastructure cannot be taken for granted
and extending this view to a model of rational voting means that improved trend growth
will be rewarded at the ballot. Rational voters will attribute a high value of competence
to incumbent politicians delivering strong trend growth, whose re-election prospects will be
enhanced. Recent work by Duch and Stevenson (2010) theoretically justies this type of
retrospective votingin a signal-extraction model which we build upon below, though their
work does not distinguish between cycle and trend as argued for here.7
Distinction between economic trend and cycle would not be necessary were economic
business cycles more short-lived events than they actually are. However the duration of
economic and electoral cycles are of the same order of magnitude. For the US Burns and
Mitchell (1946) found that business cycle duration ranged from 6 to 34 quarters and more
recently the National Bureau of Economic Research registered 7 postwar business cycles
with a minimum duration of 6 quarters and a maximum of 43 quarters.8 These duration
statistics compare with electoral cycles usually varying between 3 and 5 years. The point is
that a government commencing in recession and ending in unsustainable boom may prove
electorally unpopular if trend growth is weak. Conversely an incumbent who began o¢ ce
during a boom standing for re-election in recession may yet win if the electorate are persuaded
7Norpath (1996) argues strongly for retrospective voting, while Mackuen, Erikson and Stimson (1992)
argue that voters are sophisticatedinsofar that they reward incumbents for future events rather than past
economic performance. The approach taken by Duch and Stevenson provides a reconciliation of these views:
voters may both be sophisticated and backward-looking.
8See Everts (2006) for an examination of these numbers.
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that the fundamental state of the economy has been enhanced.
In the theoretical analysis we model voters as able to decompose output levels into trend
and cycle. This is a strong assumption: at any point in time forecasters and commentators
may di¤er substantially in their estimates of trend and cycle,9 and it is tempting to argue
that if experts cannot agree then the lowly electorate must have no idea at all. The signals by
which the electorate glean information concerning competency are clearly unlikely to literally
take the form of accurate and contemporaneous measures of trend and cycle. However,
voters listen to political argument over the economy, and this includes arguments that a
government is only achieving respectable growth by stoking up an unsustainable boom; or
that the ination rate has been brought down only by throwing people out of work. If voters
can perceive a cycle they must also be able to perceive the trend around which it revolves.
So the possibility that they can pick out the trend - even if we are merely talking about just
some voters, some of the time - should at least be modeled so that it can be tested.
As well as signals of competence manifest in trend growth, the rational forward-looking
voter will also have an interest in how candidates at election propose to deal with the
particular inherited cyclical position of the economy. The Clientele Hypothesis advocated
by Rattinger (1991) and Swank (1993) posits that left-wing parties might be elected to deal
with unemployment (because they are seen as more competent or enthusiastic at tackling it)
while right-wing parties are voted in to deal with ination.10 Carlsen (2000) nds a degree
9For example the end-point problemin ltering trend from cycle has generated a substantial econometric
literature (see e.g. Baxter and King, 1999).
10Of course this line of reasoning requires substantive ideological di¤erences between the parties. An often
heard criticism of political parties in Anglo-Saxon countries at least is that parties are indistinguishable from
one another. Nonetheless, empirical research often nds that there are systematic party di¤erences, as found
e.g. in the US by Ansolabehere et al (2001) and Poole and Rosenthal (1984 and 1997) and internationally
within analyses of Manifesto content (Budge et al, 1987).
The uni-dimensional policy assumption has also been questioned, but there is widespread recognition of
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of support for these ideas using popularity data, though the results vary substantially across
countries and regime types. In the theory below, following Alesina and Rosenthal (1989,
1995) and others, parties are distinguished by how they weight output relative to ination
in their objective function. Left- (right-) wing parties are less (more) ination averse than
the median voter, and place greater (less) weight on output. It turns out that voting should
not follow a clientele hypothesis as previously proposed. Rather, as per Downs (1957) the
party closest to the median voter always has an electoral advantage. The novel result here
is that the reward to centralizing is higher during recessions than in economic good times.
The underpinning of this result lies in the convexity of the loss function. In good times the
economy is closer to the bliss pointand in such circumstances voters are more tolerant of
deviation from the median. Conversely when the economy is in recession deviations from
the median result in proportionately greater welfare losses and are therefore punished more
severely by voters.
The empirical work builds on Whitten and Palmer (1999), examining the response of
incumbent party vote shares in general elections in OECD countries. In contrast to previous
research we argue that it is appropriate in cross-national empirical work to control for both
country xed e¤ects and time e¤ects. For one thing the average vote required to obtain
a majority varies with the political system and, as argued by Whitten and Palmer (1999)
and Powell and Whitten (1993), particular features of di¤erent polities might be expected
to a¤ect incumbent vote shares di¤erently. These considerations point towards the use of
the existence of a meaningful left-right ideological dimension. In theoretical models multi-dimensionality fre-
quently brings with it instability (e.g. McKelvey (1976)) whilst as Grofman (2004) observes policy positions
taken in practice are often quite stable. Empirically Poole and Rosenthal (1991) argue that roll-call voting
in the US is characterised by a singular predominant major dimension. Furthermore a central argument of
the Comparative Manifestos Project, which we draw upon for our empirical research, is that their left-right
measure is a meaningful predictor of actual party policy.
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xed e¤ects on top of the controls advocated by Whitten and Palmer (1999). Time e¤ects
are justied following recent research by Leigh (2009) who nds an inuence of the world
economy on national election results (though as is common in the literature he does not
disentangle trend from cycle), and the essence of the argument propounded here is that it is
national trend growth net of the global average that signals competency. Hence for example
trend growth of 3% per year would represent more of an achievement in the early 1980s when
average rates were low than in the 1960s when they were considerably higher. For this reason
it is essential to net out time e¤ects, which otherwise would contaminate the interpretation
of trend growth as a competency measure.
We nd that incumbent partiesvote shares in general elections are positively and sig-
nicantly associated with trend growth during the previous term of o¢ ce. This holds in
contrast to data for raw economic growth (i.e. that conates trend and cyclical e¤ects).
The results are strongest for the cases where governments should be more plausibly held
accountable as argued by Powell and Whitten (1993) and Whitten and Palmer (1999). The
strength of the evidence is such that we posit, contrary to the extant empirical research, that
the trend growth-voting relationship constitutes a robust fact of elections. Using ideology
data generated from manifestos we also nd support of the auxiliary hypothesis that the
electoral rewards to centralizing are strongest in recessions. We also nd that the premium
to centralizing is reduced as ination increases. It appears that as ination increases voters
look to more radical solutions in terms of macroeconomic management. However the infer-
ence for these latter hypotheses is somewhat weaker as the analysis is necessarily restricted
to two-party systems.
The next section presents a formal model of how voting might separately respond to the
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economic trend and cycle. The third section details the empirical analysis and section 4
concludes.
2 Theory
The theory builds on Duch and Stevenson (2010), though here we distinguish trend from
cycle. GDP in logarithms (yit) is indexed by political party (i) and time (t) and is decomposed
into
yit =
_
yit + eyit (1)
where
_
yit is trend and eyit the cyclical component. The trend follows a process,
_
yit = d+
_
yt 1 + it (2)
where d  0 is a deterministic drift common across parties (e.g. driven by technological
progress). The rst distinction between prospective parties of government pertains to com-
petence. In particular it is a composite shock term comprised of
it = "it + t (3)
where "it is the competenceof party i and t is luck, e.g. depending on global economic
conditions outside the control of the national government. The problem that the voter faces
is a signal extraction problem where it is observed at date t, but the separate ingredients
of competence and luck are only learnt with a one-period lag. Nonetheless competence for
the incumbent party can be partially inferred from economic performance, depending on
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the underlying distributions of "it and t which are known. Competence is assumed to be
persistent, i.e.
"it = it + it 1 (4)
where it is independently and identically distributed with mean zero (hence this is the
expected competence of the opposition) and variance 2. Similarly the non-political (luck)
shocks are IID with zero mean and variance 2 .
From here suppose two party competition and dene i = fI; Og where I represents the
incumbent party and O the opposition. When facing an election in period t to determine
the government in period t + 1 voters infer future competence of the incumbent by taking
expectations
E ["It+1] = E

It+1

+ E

Itj
_
yIt

:
Following Duch and Stevenson (2010) and before them Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) voters
learn the value of competency with a one period delay, hence in period t voters know It 1
and
_
yIt but not It which must be inferred. Using (2), (3) and (4) dene
It  It + t =
_
yIt   d 
_
yt 1   It 1
which is analogous to equation (1.7) in Duch and Stevenson (2010). It is in aggregate ob-
served (because the RHS of the equality is observed in period t) but comprises two unknown
elements, whose distributions are known. The conditional expectation of It is thus
E [ItjIt] =
2
2 + 
2

 _
yIt   d 
_
yt 1   It 1

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and the expectation of
_
yIt+1 is therefore
E
_
yIt+1
It = d+ _yIt + 22 + 2  _yIt   d  _yt 1   It 1 : (5)
On the other hand because the opposition is not in power their competence cannot be
inferred, so expectations of future output under the opposition are straightforwardly
E
_
yOt+1

= d+
_
yIt: (6)
The di¤erence between incumbent and opposition in expected trend growth boils down
to the second term on the RHS of (5). In general, increases in trend growth will help the
incumbent, and will do so to a greater degree when it is known that the government, as
opposed say to global technological progress, is identiably responsible for those increases.
The argument of this paper is that competence is a key driver of domestic trend growth,
which analytically means that 2 is at least of the same order of magnitude as 
2
 . Nonetheless
external drivers of trend growth clearly exist. Duch and Stevenson (2010) point out that
the extent of openness might matter. If a country is substantially engaged in international
trade, then demand for exports will depend on growth in partner nations. Nonetheless the
domestic production process underpinning exports will still be governed domestically, most
directly through trade policy, but also through public sector investment decisions in human
capital and industrial policy. Hence even in an economy that exports its entire GDP voters
might still be expected to reward trend growth insofar as it encapsulates competence. On
the other hand the external driver might be global technological progress, which given the
public good nature of knowledge would transcend international borders. With the exception
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of the US this realistically would be outside national government control.
The second distinction between the two parties is ideological, and relates to the man-
agement of the economy in the short-run (i.e. left and right are assumed to equally value
long-run trend growth). The policy trade-o¤ between the cyclical component of output and
ination is dened in a Phillips curve,
eyt = eyt 1 + t   et + vt (7)
where 0   < 1 denes the degree of persistence in the short-run economy, t and et are
ination and its expectation and vt is an IID short-run supply shock with zero mean and
variance 2v.
Here denoting i = fL;Rg the two parties have visible distinct left- and right-wing ide-
ologies. Specically their objective functions are
Wit+1 =  
2
it+1
2
+ 
_
yit+1   i
(eyit+1   k)
2
2
(8)
where  > 0 is a common-to-all taste parameter for underlying growth (i.e. shared also by
the general public) and L   = 1  R  0 represents (ideologically dependent) aversion
to the deviation of the output gap from some target level k > 0.11 Following convention in
the literature the party of the left (right) has greater (less) aversion to output gaps and the
concurrent unemployment12 than the moderate voters - denoted without subscript. Without
loss of generality we have set  = 1 (hence L  1 and R  1) for analytical convenience.
11The parameter k is commonly used in the ination bias literature: one possible rationale is that the nat-
ural rate of the economy entails a certain degree of ine¢ ciency (e.g. resulting from monopolistic competition)
hence a desire to expand the economy.
12 i.e. through Okuns law.
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The welfare function proposed here is a generalization of Duch and Stevenson (2010) who do
not distinguish between short- and long-run, or indeed policy di¤erences along ideological
grounds. The short-run policy instrument is monetary policy, which amounts to choosing an
ination rate to maximize (8) subject to (7). The rst order condition yields ex post policy
it+1 =
i
1 + i
 
k   eyt + et+1   vt+1 (9)
and
eyit+1 = eyt + ik   et+1 + vt+1
1 + i
(10)
hence Lt+1 > Rt+1 and eyLt+1 > eyRt+1 as in Alesina and Rosenthal (1989). For given
ination expectations both ination and the output gap are higher (lower) under the left
(right) than the values preferred by society.
Ination expectations depend on the probability (p) of a left-wing election victory and
the expected policies of the two candidates i.e.
et+1 = p
e
Lt+1 + (1  p)eRt+1:
Applying rational expectations to (9) yields
et+1 =
" pL
1+L
+ (1 p)R
1+R
1  pL
1+L
  (1 p)R
1+R
#
(k   eyt)
which implies
k   eyt + et+1 = (1 + L) (1 + R)1 + (1  p) L + pR (k   eyt) (11)
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which we make use of below.
Voters evaluate the di¤erence in expected welfare E []  E [WLt+1]   E [WRt+1], with
the left winning if E [] > 0. Using (5), (6), (9) and (10) then
E [] = D:
2
2 + 
2

 _
yIt   d 
_
yt 1   It 1

+
(L   R) (1  LR)
(1 + R)
2 (1 + L)
2
 
k   eyt + et+12
(12)
where D = 1 depending on whether the incumbent is from the left or right. Substituting
(11) into this yields
E [] = D:
2
2 + 
2

 _
yIt   d 
_
yt 1   It 1

+
(L   R) (1  LR)
[1 + (1  p) L + pR]2
(k   eyt)2 (13)
Equation (13) links the vote to the economy on two separate dimensions. The rst term on
the RHS relates to the long-run economic trend and the capacity of voters to disentangle luck
from competence (which depend on the underlying distributions of it and t). The second
term relates to the short-run cycle, and depends on the policy platforms (characterized
by the parameters L and R) taken by the two parties. We are not of course assuming
that equation (13) encapsulates the whole of a voters welfare gain or loss from retaining
the incumbent. Not only would that be to assert that voting is exclusively economic but,
given the set-up of the model, it would make elections unanimous a¤airs. We are merely
postulating that the likelihood that any given voter will support the government is increasing
in E []. So too, therefore, will be the incumbents share of the vote.
Economic competence impacts the vote as it does in Duch and Stevenson (2010), except
here it is represented by trend growth rather than growth in raw terms. The bracketed part
of the rst term on the RHS is positive or negative depending on the di¤erence between total
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observed trend growth and that part of it known to be independent of government compe-
tence. Positive values of this di¤erential denote high expected future (relative) competence.
As in Duch and Stevenson (2010) this is tempered if global (luck) shocks are known to have
larger variation than competence shocks in which case the impact of trend growth on the
vote will be relatively small.
The impact of the short-run economic position on the vote is encapsulated in the second
term on the RHS of (13). Note rst that this term is positive only if LR < 1. There
is a clear median voter type interpretation of this result. When the product term LR
is greater than unity (recall we have set  = 1), the right-wing party is more moderate
than the left. High values of L represent extremism by the left, whilst high values of R
represent moderation by the right. If the product term is low then it is the left who are more
moderate.13 Whilst the median voter argument is not new, it is interesting and we believe
novel that the result is sharpened in economic adversity, i.e. the further away the economy
is from its bliss pointk.14 The sensitivity of the expected welfare di¤erence (and hence
voting) to ideological di¤erences is increasing as the state of the economy deteriorates. A
recession (eyt < 0) magnies the e¤ect of the relative ideological positions taken by the parties,
13In the case of identical policies, i.e. L = R =  = 1; then voters are indi¤erent between the parties,
at least as far as management of the economic cycle is concerned.
14A maintained assumption in the theoretical work is that the ideological positioning of the parties is
exogenous to the state of the economy. A natural reaction to the analysis is that parties ought to moderate
in general, at least if they are o¢ ce motivated. There is a large theoretical literature examining the ideological
positioning choices made by political parties (e.g. see Grofmann, 2004). These decisions will in part depend
on constitutional features. In systems with primaries (e.g. the US) or two stages of elections (e.g. France)
candidates may polarize in the rst stage in order to maximize their chances of reaching the second stage.
A universal property of democratic systems is that prospective prime ministers must rst win the approval
of their party (usually as party leader) and then win the approval of the electorate at large. The costs of
reneging ex post are likely to be quite high, so adjustment to the median voter in the second round may not
be feasible. Alternatively politicians may themselves have ideological preferences which they weight as well
as being motivated by o¢ ce.
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where as ideological di¤erences become less important as eyt approaches k. Observe that the
model does not deliver a conventional clientele hypothesis as described in the introduction.
Previous work has argued that the left-wing get an electoral bonus when the economy is
in recession, and that the right-wing does well in times of ination. The results we derive
are quite di¤erent: there is no such clientele e¤ect in the framework studied here, rather an
impetus for moderation that becomes increasingly potent during economic adversity. Hence
the model does not predict that the left will benet from recession, nor that the right will
benet from ination.
A possible extension to the theoretical framework presented here would be to endogenize
p, the probability of a left-wing victory. The essence of the story here is that this proba-
bility depends on economic circumstances. However endogenizing p is not a straightforward
exercise,15 nor would it alter the conclusions as presented. Because the denominator in the
second term of the RHS of (13) is squared, whatever the value of p, the arguments of the
previous paragraph still hold.
In sum equation (13) is the bottom line of a model of economic voting where voters are
rational and forward-looking and distinguish between economic trend and cycle. There are
two distinct inuences of the economy on the vote. The rst is the impact of underlying trend
growth and is forward-looking, though also retrospective in the sense that past economic per-
formance a¤ects expected future competence. The second inuence is also forward-looking in
that voting depends on expectations of how parties would trade o¤ output against ination
depending on the current position in the economic cycle. Taken together the two inuences
provide a formalization of why incumbent parties have done well in particular elections when
15For example, if we proxy p by E [] itself then equation (13) becomes cubic.
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the economy is in recession. For example on a naive interpretation of economic voting, con-
ditions in the UK in both 1983 and 1992 would (incorrectly) point to a loss for the Tory
incumbents. However during these elections the opposition Labour party, arguably at least
and also in the data utilized below, was too far from the center-ground, and in both in-
stance the Tories maintained power, in the rst instance with an increased majority, and
in the second winning power for an unprecedented fourth term.16 The reverse happened in
1997, when the Tory incumbent was defeated in a landslide, but economic conditions were
favorable, while the Labour party had by now substantially shifted to the ideological middle
ground. France in 1968 provides another interesting case study. The economy was in a
deep recession, yet the incumbent Gaullist party increased its majority over the Socialists.
However while the cycle was strongly negative we estimate trend growth in France at this
point in time to be quite strong. Given also that the Gaullists were more moderate than
the Socialists,17 their reelection is entirely consistent with the model of economic voting pre-
sented here. Anderson (2000, 2007) and Sanders and Carey (2002) make the related point
that citizens will desert the governing party only when a viable alternative exists.
In short, if voters are forward-looking then we would expect instability in the vote-
economy relationship when the economy is surmised only in raw terms. The instability
arises because the impact of trend growth and the economic cycle should be separated. The
16Labours verbose manifesto for the 1983 general election was described by Gerald Kaufman (a Labour
MP) as the longest suicide note in historyin light of its ideological extremism. There is a commonly held
view that Labour had not completed its journey to the center ground until Tony Blairs election victory in
1997 with the New Labourparty. For example the infamous Clause IVwas not revised until 1995.
17France in 1968 was quite polarized. The Socialists rile score (described below) for this election was
-42.1 against the Gaullists31.3. To put these numbers into context note that the median voter in France
on average has had an ideological position of 0.54. Throughout the 1960s the Socialists maintained a
consistently radical stance, with scores of -49.5 in 1962 and -38.0 in 1967. In contrast the Gaullists were
relatively moderate with scores of 9.6 and 11.0.
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next section investigates these hypotheses empirically.
3 Empirical Evidence
The theory proposes two distinct hypotheses. The primary hypothesis is that trend economic
growth is a signicant predictor of incumbent vote share. Moreover it is anticipated that
trend economic growth has greater statistical strength in predicting election results than raw
economic growth, which is contaminated by the cycle. This is a straightforward hypothesis
that plausibly should hold across democratic systems and hence we make full use of the data
set in order to test it. The secondary hypothesis, relating to the economic cycle, is that the
electoral reward to centralizing is stronger during recessions. The model above relates to
two-party competition, and as such is di¢ cult to apply in multiple-party democracies where
questions of ideological positioning become substantially more complex. For this reason in
this instance the analysis is restricted to elections that can reasonably be characterized as
being contested by two main parties. This necessarily reduces the sample quite considerably,
though these results are also of interest in their own right.
3.1 Data
The starting point for the empirical analysis is Whitten and Palmer (1999) who use the total
vote share of the incumbent parties in general elections as the dependent variable,18 denoted
V oteit where i identies the country and t the election date. We look at the same countries
18To identify whether or not the party was in o¢ ce during the previous regime we used the data of
Waldendorp et al (1998) and for more recent elections the World Banks Database of Political Institutions.
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as Whitten and Palmer (1999),19 and extend their data set (which ends in the early 1990s)
to include recent elections, increasing the dataset from 142 elections to 243 elections.
Real GDP series were taken from the OECD Quarterly National Accounts database,
measured for all countries in US dollars at purchasing power parity. These data begin in
1960(Q1) and end in 2009(Q4). In order to obtain measures for economic trend and cycle
these data were transformed into natural logarithms and then decomposed using the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) lter.20 The annualized average quarterly growth rate of the GDP trend
during the term of o¢ ce (g_y) is used to measure incumbent competence. Table 1 contains
descriptive statistics of the data used in this study, and shows that average trend growth in
the sample is about 3% with meaningful dispersion around this. In a panel regression of g_y on
country xed e¤ects and annual time e¤ects the adjusted R2 is 0.57 - showing considerable
unexplained variation both within and between countries. As is well known growth was
strongest across the board during the 1960s, and was for some time systematically higher
in Japan and Ireland whilst notably lower in Denmark, Switzerland and the UK. Trend
growth is of course correlated with conventional raw economic growth as measured over the
corresponding time periods (dened as gy), but Figure 1 below demonstrates that there is
sizeable variation between the trend and raw growth measures. The R-square in a bivariate
regression is equal to 0.75, hence there is also meaningful cyclical noise in the raw data as
19Specically Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
20There is a considerable econometric literature examining alternative means of decomposing time-series
data into trend and cycle, and alternatives to the HP lter exist. Nonetheless, according to the World Bank
the HP lter is the most common method used to this end in applied macroeconomic research.
Alternatives such as the Baxter-King (1999) band-pass lter di¤er substantially only at the end-points of
the data. Because the election dates all fall well within the time period for which we have GDP data there
are no substantive di¤erences between the cycle estimates of the alternative lters. Using the Baxter-King
lter does not change any of the results reported here in any important way.
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would be expected. ey denotes the HP cyclical component of GDP in the quarter of the
election, and whilst the average position in the cycle at the time of election is almost exactly
zero, ey has similar dispersion to g_y . Following previous empirical analyses of voting we also
include ination in the empirical analysis and ination data () are taken from the World
Development Indicators.
For the secondary hypothesis the sample of elections is necessarily restricted to elections
where there are two clearly identiable main parties ghting the election (two party systems).
This reduces the sample to the Anglo Saxon countries, Spain and four elections from Austria
from the 1970s. The ideology data are taken from the Comparative Manifestos Project
(CMP), described in Budge et al (2001) and Klingemann et al (2006). This database contains
detailed policy platform data ascertained from party manifestos for lower house21 general
elections. The CMP right-left ideological data, rileijt where j denotes the party, lie on an
interval between  100; representing the extreme left, and +100 representing the extreme
right.22 Using voting data as well allows computation of the median voter at each election,
following the method of Kim and Fording (2001). To measure the extent to which incumbent
parties capture the middle ground, their ideological distance from the median voter (govdist)
is compared with that of the opposition (oppdist) and relative distance is dened as reldist =
govdist   oppdist. Values of reldist > (<)0 imply that the governing party is further
from (closer to) the median voter than the opposition. Descriptive statistics for reldist
are reported in Table 1. Its mean value is close to zero, implying that on average the two
21Excepting the United States, where presidential elections are the unit of observation.
22The rile series are the principal output of the CMP research project and are "reliable and valid" according
to the original authors when compared against expert opinion and mass perceptions data. These data have
been used in a variety of di¤erent settings, e.g. by McDonald et al (2004) and Pickering and Rockey
(forthcoming).
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parties are equidistant from the median voter. Nonetheless there is quite a lot of dispersion,
with many instances of either the incumbent and/or the opposition being far away from the
center.
Throughout the regression analysis we follow Powell and Whitten (1993) and Whitten
and Palmer (1999) by controlling for the clarity of responsibility of the incumbent parties.
Essentially the incumbent vote is argued to decline over time more sharply when clarity of
responsibility is greater. Clarity of responsibility is diminished in a number of di¤erent ways.
Firstly in Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the US there is markedly weaker party cohesion in
that representatives in the same party regularly vote against one another. Secondly in a
number of countries opposition parties have taken on important roles such as committee
chairs in the legislature.23 Third, in Australia, the US and Germany the upper house has
a substantial policymaking role and has sometimes been controlled by opposition parties.
Fourth, minority governments cannot pass legislation without some support from opposition
parties. The argument in all cases is that the loss in votes for incumbent parties will be
reduced when identiable responsibility is reduced. Following Whitten and Palmer the re-
gression analysis controls for dummy variables weakpty, oppchair, bicamopp and minority
respectively set equal to one in situations of weak party cohesion, opposition representation
in chairs of key committees, meaningful bicameralism and minority government. Two further
controls are also included by Whitten and Palmer (1999) - the duration of o¢ ce in the case
of minority governments (mindur) and the number of government parties (ngovpty).
Lastly, and again following previous work, the regression analysis controls for the vote
share of the incumbent at the previous election (V oteit 1) as voting patterns are widely
23Specically Austria, Belgium, Denmark (after 1973), West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
and Switzerland.
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known to be highly persistent, although on average governments tend to lose support from
one election to the next (Paldam, 1986). In addition to the lagged dependent variable and the
clarity of responsibilitycontrols, but in contrast to previous work, we also include country
dummy variables and time e¤ects. Inclusion of xed e¤ects ensures that any unobserved
and non-time-varying country specic variables that might a¤ect the incumbent vote (either
through clarity of responsibilityor otherwise) are controlled for. Inclusion of time e¤ects
ensures that any common world events (in particular global technological progress, but also
for example changes in oil prices, global economic cycles, or indeed common ideological
trends) that might a¤ect the incumbent vote share (i.e. following Leigh, 2009) are also
controlled for. Previous comparative studies have controlled neither for xed e¤ects nor
for time e¤ects: their inclusion represents a much more onerous, though statistically more
legitimate, test of the economic data in voting regressions.
3.2 Trend growth and the economic vote
The benchmark for the empirical analysis is Whitten and Palmer (1999) who estimate
V oteit = 0+1V oteit 1 + 2bicamoppit+3weakptyit (14)
+4oppchairit+5minorityit+6mindurit+7ngovptysit
The results of this regression are contained in column (1) of Table 2. These results are
comparable with Whitten and Palmer (1999: Table 2, p. 56). There is a high degree
of persistence in voting, and the sign, size and signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients
corresponding to the political control variables are consistent with the previous ndings. In
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particular, when the clarity of responsibility is weakened, so is the erosion of the incumbent
vote. To investigate the extent of the economic vote, this specication is augmented to
include data for trend economic growth, the current position in the cycle and ination, with
the results presented in column (2). As anticipated trend growth positively impacts the vote
and is strongly statistically signicant (at the 1% level). In column (3) of Table 2 average
trend growth is replaced by raw average growth over the term of o¢ ce. In the absence of
trend growth raw growth is a signicant regressor. As already acknowledged raw growth
and trend growth are correlated, so this signicance is potentially entirely due to the trend.
Column (4) contains estimation results of a "horse-race" regression that includes both trend
growth and raw growth. Whilst inference here is problematic because of multicollinearity
(biasing the standard errors upwards) the horse-race is at least indicative that it is the trend
rather than raw growth that is driving the result. Even here trend growth is estimated to
have a positive impact on the incumbent vote and is estimated to be signicant at a level of
11.9%. In contrast raw growth exhibits a negative sign and is wholly insignicant.24
Also notable from Table 2 is the nding that the cyclical element plays no role in driving
the incumbent vote. Curiously it is also found that ination positively impacts the incum-
bent vote share. This last nding is counterintuitive, though is not a new nding in the
literature.25
The results are encouraging in that it is clear that the trend and cycle in GDP impact
the incumbent vote di¤erentially. Consistent with the above theory the trend is a signicant
24To reiterate, interpretation of the "horse-race" regression is potentially problematic because of multi-
collinearity. Indeed the VIF value of gy in this regression is 8.97 (indicative that multicollinearity may be a
problem). However the econometric literature is not yet decided on critical VIF values (e.g. OBrien, 2007).
Because the central purpose of the present paper is a comparison of the statistical strength of the trend and
raw growth measures for completeness we report regressions containing each variable separately and both.
25For example Palmer and Whitten (1999) also report a positive and signicant coe¢ cient for ination.
21
determinant whilst the cycle is not. In Table 3 we investigate whether the nding of a
signicant impact of trend growth holds in di¤erent subsamples. In light of Powell and
Whitten (1993) clarity of responsibility should qualify the impact of trend growth. Where
it is easier to attribute success or otherwise to the governing party the electoral response
to trend growth should be stronger. Where clarity of responsibility is low rational voters
will attribute at least part of the inferred competency to the opposition. To investigate this
columns (1)-(4) split the sample according to two of the clarity of responsibility variables.26
Columns (1) and (2) distinguish between regimes where opposition parties do and do not
chair important committees in government. Column (1) corresponds to regimes without
opposition representation (59% of the sample), and here the estimated coe¢ cient for trend
growth actually increases and maintains signicance at the 1% level. In contrast, in column
(2), where responsibility is less clear, the economic vote is of the same sign and magnitude,
but much less precisely estimated and signicant only at the 10% level. On the other hand
the distinction between outright majority governments (74% of the sample - in column 3) and
minority governments (column 4) is less clear cut. Trend growth is positive and signicant
in both, and if anything the economic vote is stronger in the minorities subsample, though
the di¤erence is not signicant and the sample size of minorities is quite small.
However, as we have argued, a much stronger test of the signicance of the economic
vote lies in an econometric specication that includes both xed e¤ects and time e¤ects,
which have been omitted in previous studies. Moreover, a regression of the incumbent
vote on its lag, xed e¤ects and time e¤ects already explains a very large fraction of the
26The reason for focussing on just two of these variables is that splitting the sample by other clarity of
responsibility variables leads to very small sample sizes. (The means of the dummy variables reported in
Table 1 imply this.)
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economic vote - the R2 using the full data set is 0.88. This does not leave much room for
an economic vote, should one exist. Nonetheless there are good reasons for including xed
e¤ects and time e¤ects and subsequent regression analysis thus includes these additional
controls. Column (1) of Table 4 is the same specication as column (2) of Table 2 but
includes xed e¤ects and time e¤ects. In this regression trend growth is signicant at the
2% level, and the estimated coe¢ cient increases in size relative to the previous results. A
one standard deviation improvement in trend growth on average yields the incumbent an
additional 1.7% of the vote, all else equal. This is a small, but meaningful average e¤ect.
To put this into context note that there have been 4 US presidential elections since 1960 in
which the winners absolute lead was less than 1% (including a negative lead in 2000). Strong
performance in terms of trend growth clearly could be enough to decide the election. It is
also noticeable from this regression that the curious positive impact of ination is washed out
by the additional controls (conrming the suspicion that this nding is driven by elections
from the 1970s.)
In column (2) of Table 4 average trend growth is replaced by raw average growth over
the term of o¢ ce. Unlike trend growth raw growth is not robust to the inclusion of xed
e¤ects and time e¤ects. Whilst the estimated impact is positive it is not statistically sig-
nicant. This regression characterizes the current state of knowledge as summarized in the
introduction: in the literature raw economic growth has not really proven a robust predictor
of incumbent vote shares. On the other hand the principal contribution here is that trend
growth is a robust predictor of the vote, surviving in the presence of a considerable battery of
control variables. The "horse-race" regression of column (3) conrms the argument. When
trend growth and raw growth are both included the former is signicant with a p-value of
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1.2%, whilst as previously raw growth is estimated to have a negative though insignicant
impact on incumbent vote shares. The evidence clearly points to the superiority of trend
growth over raw growth as a determinant of the vote.
Columns (4)-(7) of Table 4 repeat the analysis of Table 3 to include xed and time
e¤ects. Comparison of columns (4) and (5) shows that trend growth is a positive and
signicant determinant of the incumbent vote only in democracies where opposition parties
do not have a role chairing important government committees. With majority governments
(column 6) the estimated coe¢ cient for trend growth increases slightly to 1.27 and whilst
the estimated coe¢ cient for trend growth actually increases further in the minorities sample,
it is not signicant at conventional levels. In both cases the evidence for an economic vote
is most clear in countries where clarity of responsibility is greatest, as would be expected.
Overall the evidence from this section points towards a robust economic vote. The
inclusion of xed e¤ects and time e¤ects in the econometric analysis of economic voting
represents a considerable up-shift in terms of econometric rigour, making it a big ask to nd
evidence for an economic vote. Nonetheless trend growth over the term of o¢ ce is found
to be a statistically signicant predictor of the incumbent vote share, and as expected this
relationship is clearest in elections where clarity of responsibility is greatest.
3.3 Cycles and the median voter
The secondary hypotheses relate to the ideological positioning taken by the two parties. If
the incumbent centralizes relative to the opposition this should yield votes in accordance
with standard Downsian argument. Furthermore our model predicts that this centralizing
premium will be increasing, the further away the economy is from the bliss point, or equiva-
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lently as the economy moves into recession. To investigate these hypotheses we develop the
regression model to estimate
V oteit= 0+X + _yg
_
y + Ireldist+ eyey + Ieyreldist  ey
where X are the control variables detailed in (14) above.27 As discussed earlier the sample
in this section is necessarily restricted to two party systems. The specic hypotheses are
rstly that I < 0, implying that greater ideological distance of the incumbent, relative to
the opposition party, from the median voter will reduce the incumbent vote share. This
represents a test of the median voter theorem and is of interest in its own right. In order to
investigate the novel hypothesis that the median voter argument is contingent on the state
of the economy interactive terms are employed. The theory above (equation 13) implies
that Iey > 0: the worse the state of the economy (more strictly the lower the value of ey)
the greater the electoral penalty to polarizing. When welfare losses are quadratic (or in
general convex) then the penalty for deviating from the median voter increases the further
the economy is from the preferred output gap of k.
The regression results are contained in Table 5. Column (1) excludes xed and time
e¤ects, and nds that in two party systems the estimated size of the trend growth e¤ect
increases relative to the full sample analyzed in column (2) of Table 2. Arguably clarity of
responsibility is greatest in two-party systems; hence it is reassuring that a strong e¤ect for
trend growth is found even in the substantially reduced sample.
There is also support for the median voter theorem in that relative distance from the
median is found to be penalized by the voters. The coe¢ cient estimate pertaining to reldist
27That is all of the clarity of responsibility control variables as well as the lagged dependent variable.
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is negative and signicant at the 5% level, and the unconditional e¤ect implied is sizable.28
An increase in reldist of one standard deviation (e.g. a move by the incumbent away from
the center, where the opposition is located) is estimated to result in a vote loss of 3.5%.
However, this impact has to be qualied by the interaction terms, both of which in column
(1) are estimated to be statistically signicant. The estimated coe¢ cient for Iey is positive
and signicant at the 10% level, hence there is support for conditionality in the median voter
theorem as hypothesized. The vote loss to the incumbent of polarizing is reduced when the
economy is booming, and closer to the ideal point, k. Thus for example, assuming again
zero ination and a one standard deviation increase in reldist, the vote loss from polarizing
in a one standard deviation recession (ey =  1:503) is estimated to be 5.8%, whilst the vote
loss in a one standard deviation boom is only estimated at 1.2%. The median voter theorem
bites hardest in hard times.
Table 5 also shows that when ideological distance from the median is interacted with
ination the estimated coe¢ cient is estimated to be positive and signicant. Polarizing is
estimated to yield electoral reward in times of high ination, rather than being punished.
This nding suggests that voters prefer more drastic measures, proposed either by left or
right, during times of high ination. It is likely that the policy choices characterized in
the short-run trade-o¤ between ination and output specied in the Phillips curve are not
the full story. Voters may for example demand a shift in the Phillips curve rather than a
movement along it. The UK (1979) and US (1980) general elections represent two cases
in point. Reaganomics and Thatcherism were not the politics of the middle ground, yet
delivered electoral success at times of high ination. Conversely in elections in the mid 1970s
28That is, the estimated e¤ect ignoring the interaction terms, or more precisely considering the case whereey =  = 0:
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(notably the rst 1974 election in the UK and Australia 1974) voters responded positively
to polarization, again in a time of high ination, this time by the parties of the left (the
British and Australian Labour Parties). At this point in time direct interventionist controls
may have been perceived to have been a more e¤ective agenda than the proposed policies of
the right.29
These results are veried in a regression including xed e¤ects and time e¤ects (col-
umn 2 of Table 5). The impact of trend growth is once again found to be signicant and
positive, with the size of the e¤ect increasing sizeably. In the two-party system sample of
elections, incumbents enjoy a 4.55% vote bonus for a one standard deviation improvement
in trend growth. Similarly the unconditional impact of reldist doubles in terms of e¤ect
and signicance. When ey =  = 0 a one standard deviation gain in territory is estimated
to yield an extra 6.8% of the vote. The parameter estimate for Iey remains positive though
the statistical signicance is reduced slightly. It is possible that the introduction of xed
and time e¤ects knock out some of the variation in ey (some countries might be more prone
to recession, and perhaps more likely some years are worse at a global level). This would
amount to losing information, which would explain the slight deterioration in signicance.
On the other hand the estimate for the interaction of ination and reldist remains positive
and signicant. For high levels of ination this interactive e¤ect is strong enough to knock
out the unconditional e¤ect. For example, assuming ey = 0, an ination rate of 10% reduces
the vote loss from a one standard deviation increase in reldist from 6.8% to zero. At ination
levels greater than 10% the data are suggestive of a positive vote response to polarizing -
29The nding of a positive and signicant interactive e¤ect of ination and reldist is not an artefact of
outliers. The results are robust in regressions eliminating observations with the highest Cooks distance
measures.
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indicating perhaps that in desperate times, desperate measures are called for.
We acknowledge that these ndings for this sub-section are only as good as the dataset
and 60 observations is not as many as we would have liked. Nonetheless, the data are still
indicative and consistently support the hypothesis of forward-looking voters responding to
declared policy platforms, and also that these responses are conditional on the state of the
economy. Notably we nd that the vote response to trend growth is bigger than in the full
sample, which is reassuring as responsibility is in some ways clearest in two-party systems.
We also nd an unconditional positive e¤ect to centralizing ideologically, consistent with
the median voter theorem. We also nd that the voting response to ideological platforms
taken by the two parties is highly conditional on the state of the economy. In recessions, the
median voter argument is sharpened, and the reward to centralizing is increased. Conversely
in times of high ination, to an extent the data support the idea of desperate times calling
for desperate measures. There are a number of high ination elections where moving to the
extremes have rewarded parties of both left and right, tempering the general nding of a
vote premium to centralizing.
4 Conclusion
The reports of the death of economic voting have been exaggerated. Basic macroeconomic
theory points to good reasons for believing that the rational voter will react di¤erently to
changes in trend output as opposed to cyclical movements, and previous empirical studies
have failed to make this distinction. Improvements in trend output, once global e¤ects are
controlled for, are plausibly indicative of incumbent competence. Trend growth may occur
28
through increases in factors of production brought about through sustainable investment
from either the private or public sector, or alternatively through better deployment of existing
factors of production (i.e. e¢ ciency improvements). Such improvements indicate competence
and the rational voter rewards incumbents that deliver this. On the other hand cyclical
movements typically are induced by exogenous shocks, and whilst op-ed column-writers
with the luxury of hindsight may lament the incapacity of politicians to foresee these events,
rational voters will make a more qualied assessment. When cycles are induced by oil
shocks, or global nancial crises, the responsibility of national governments should be called
into question, and it should not be taken as a done deal that incumbents will be punished
for these events.
Nonetheless, where parties di¤er from one another along ideological lines, the proposals
that they make at election time for dealing with the inherited economic position will be
of interest to voters. In line with much of the political economics literature, on two-party
competition at least, we nd a premium for ideological centralization. However this premium
is contingent on economic circumstances. During recession, the premium is predicted to
increase.
The principal empirical nding of this paper is that when GDP is decomposed into trend
and cycle there is a robust statistical relationship between trend growth and the incumbent
vote share in general elections in OECD countries. We have argued that it is necessary in
cross-country empirical studies of voting to control for both xed e¤ects and time e¤ects,
and under this more stringent test of the data, trend-growth remains statistically signicant
whilst raw growth data does not. In contrast with current mainstream thinking we contest
that, measured this way, the economic vote exists and is a robust fact about elections.
29
In a smaller sample of elections characterized by two-party competition we also nd sup-
port for the median voter hypothesis, and the novel hypothesis that the reward to centralizing
is conditional on the state of the economy. In line with our model the reward is sharpened in
recession. When output is below trend parties closer to the median do especially well, whilst
the data suggest that in times of high ination voters have historically rewarded parties for
moving to the extremes. Future theoretical work will consider mechanisms underpinning
this; it seems likely that when ination is very high voters demand shifts in the Phillips
curve rather than movements along it.
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Variable no. obs. mean std. dev.
V ote 243 46:8 12:83
bicamopp 243 0:136 0:343
weakpty 243 0:185 0:389
oppchair 243 0:407 0:492
minority 243 0:263 0:441
mindur 243 8:14 15:56
ngovptys 243 1:95 1:25
g_y 238 3:13 1:59ey 238 0:018 1:503
 230 5:28 4:21
reldist 64  1:75 19:9
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. Variables are dened in the text.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
V otet 1 0:889
(0:045)
(including
bicamopp 1:571
(0:903)
column 1
weakpty 2:663
(0:807)
controls) X X X
oppchair 1:911
(0:777)
gy 0:559
(0:217)
 0:215
(0:516)
minority 3:128
(1:460)
g_y 0:683
(0:239)
0:892
(0:571)
mindur  0:093
(0:047)
ey 0:183
(0:243)
 0:052
(0:282)
0:280
(0:295)
ngovpty 1:571
(0:903)
 0:178
(0:080)
0:176
(0:081)
0:181
(0:080)
Sample full full full
Observations 243 226 226 226
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Table 2: Regression results
Robustly estimated standard errors reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at
the 1% level,  denotes signicance at the 5% level and  denotes signicance at the 10%
level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
(incl. CoR
controls) X X X X
g_y 0:838
(0:255)
0:785
(0:413)
0:586
(0:261)
0:952
(0:550)ey 0:277
(0:298)
0:052
(0:345)
0:186
(0:284)
0:192
(0:506)
 0:219
(0:088)
0:139
(0:178)
0:213
(0:096)
0:087
(0:155)
Sample oppchair oppchair minority minority
 X  X
133 93 162 64
0.69 0.90 0.84 0.72
Table 3: Regression results
Notes as for Table 2. All regressions include the clarity of responsibility (CoR) controls
used in Table 2 as well as the lagged dependent variable.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(incl. CoR
controls) X X X X X X X
gy 0:553
(0:390)
 0:640
(0:569)
g_y 1:09
(0:439)
1:720
(0:676)
1:021
(0:600)
 0:324
(1:261)
1:27
(0:557)
3:11
(1:712)ey 0:179
(0:300)
 0:033
(0:391)
0:491
(0:442)
0:162
(0:439)
 0:025
(0:666)
0:155
(0:388)
 0:258
(1:013)
 0:030
(0:184)
0:041
(0:187)
0:029
(0:183)
0:299
(0:313)
 0:356
(0:504)
0:120
(0:237)
0:748
(1:088)
xed e¤ects X X X X X X X
time e¤ects X X X X X X X
Sample full full full oppchair oppchair minority minority
 X  X
Observations 226 226 226 133 93 162 64
R2 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.83 0.96 0.90 0.97
Table 4: Regression results
Notes as for Table 2. All regressions include the clarity of responsibility (CoR) controls
used in Table 2 as well as the lagged dependent variable.
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(1) (2)
g_y 1:270
(0:636)
2:861
(1:265)
reldist  0:174
(0:088)
 0:342
(0:080)ey 0:104
(0:407)
0:358
(1:018)ey  reldist 0:077
(0:040)
0:088
(0:058)
 0:499
(0:165)
0:363
(0:768)
  reldist 0:021
(0:008)
0:033
(0:008)
xed e¤ects  X
time e¤ects  X
Observations 60 60
R2 0.61 0.92
Table 5: Regression results
Notes as for Table 2. All regressions include the clarity of responsibility (CoR) controls
used in Table 2 as well as the lagged dependent variable.
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